Fundamental Objects without Fundamental Properties: a Thin-object-orientated Metaphysics Grounded on Structure

The scientific realist wants to read the metaphysical picture of reality through our best fundamental physical theories. The traditional way of doing so is in terms of objects, properties, and laws of nature. For instance, there are families of fundamental particles individuated by their properties of mass and charge, which determine how they move. One could call this view an object-oriented metaphysics grounded on properties. In this paper, I wish to present an alternative view that one can dub a thin object-oriented metaphysics grounded on structure: there are fundamental entities with no fundamental properties other than the one(s) needed to specify their nature. I argue that my view has several advantages over the received one. In particular, I compare my proposal to the traditional view in the quantum domain and I argue that my view provides a better fit for both approaches to quantum metaphysics, namely the primitive ontology program and wave-function realism.