Il «Problema di Ackrill» e la «Tesi dei Due Corpi»: Per una critica all’interpretazione funzionalista della psicologia aristotelica

The «two-body thesis» has been originated as a response to «Ackrill’s Problem» on the inapplicability of the hylomorphic analysis to the soul-body relationship but is in fact the ultimate defense of the functionalist interpretation of Aristotle’s psychological theory. This essay aims at examining the relationship between the supposed «two bodies» and between them and the soul in order to demonstrate that in the case of living beings it is impossible to establish a contingent relationship between form and matter, not even at the basic level of elements or homeomerous parts. The proposal of identifying the «prime matter» of living beings in a particular homeomerous body, i.e. the product of conception in the first month of gestation, will eventually represent a possible response to Ackrill’s Problem: it will be shown that the first product of conception is matter not yet alive but naturally and essentially brought to life.