How Populist Governments Engage with Independent Regulators. Privacy protection and Financial Market Supervision in Italy

This article explores how populist governments in Italy engage with independent
regulatory authorities (IRAs), focusing on privacy and financial market oversight. Using
a comparative, episode-based approach, it analyzes appointments and regulatory
design from the Conte I to the Meloni governments (2018–present). Findings show
that populist strategies are mediated by institutional design, sector characteristics,
and EU-level constraints, as well as differences among populist actors and their shifting
agendas. IRAs face ideological challenges but are also leveraged for strategic and
functional purposes. The responses of the Italy’s Data Protection Authority
(Garante) and the National Commission for Companies and the Stock Exchange
(Consob) range from cooperation to resistance, shaped by EU frameworks. Ultimately,
Italian populist governments recalibrate rather than dismantle regulatory oversight,
selectively contesting or accommodating IRAs within a multilevel governance
system.